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Abstract. After 350 years of non-recognition, and following a 
protracted procedure, Muslim religious marriages and divorces are 
currently in the process of being directly and formally recognised in terms 
of South African law. A 2010 ‘code’ of Muslim Personal Law has been 
framed that can satisfy and synthesise both diverse Muslim (ideological) 
perspectives and the relevant constitutional commands (guarantees of 
religious freedom and equality to all South Africans). One of the key 
objectives of the proposed legislation is to regulate the consequences 
flowing from the termination of such marriages through 
divorce. My paper provides an analytical overview of the legal 
consequences flowing from a Muslim divorce in the context of South 
African law, Islamic law and the proposed 2010 Muslim Marriages Bill 
and focuses on the post-divorce support and position of minor and 
dependent Muslim children. As such, it is limited to the areas of 
guardianship, care, access and maintenance. 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper provides an analytical overview of the legal consequences flowing from a 
Muslim divorce in the context of South African law, Islamic law and the proposed 2010 
Muslim Marriages Bill, and focuses on the post-divorce support and position of minor 
and dependent Muslim children. As such, it is limited to the areas of guardianship, care, 
access and maintenance. 
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2. General Context  
 
Muslims first arrived in South Africa more than 350 years ago. Although the South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), as the governmental body responsible for 
considering law reform, some 25 years ago already started with an investigation into the 
possible recognition of their religious marriages2, Muslim marriages and divorces are 
currently still not directly recognised in terms of South African law. As a result, Muslim 
children were, until 2005, still stigmatised as ‘illegitimate’ even though their parents 
were married to each other in terms of Islamic law.  It is suggested that the status quo  is 
exacerbated by the fact that in South African Muslim households the majority of 
Muslim women can be deemed to fall into the (ideological) category of conservative-
Islamist Muslims most of whom are encouraged to be ‘home-makers’ and stay-at-home 
mothers while their husbands are primarily, though not necessarily, the sole 
breadwinners. Whilst theoretically well provided for during marriage, the nature of the 
Muslim marriage contract, which by default is deemed to be an ante-nuptial contract 
without any community of property and accrual, also means that the wife who did not 
work outside of the home, whether by choice or because she was not permitted to do so 
by her husband, and who is also not in possession of much self-generated or inherited 
wealth and education, is often left with few resources upon divorce. Given this reality in 
a negative economic climate which also affects ex-husbands who struggle to earn a 
decent income, the fact that her religious entitlement upon divorce is both limited and 
temporary, means that many South African Muslim women and their children will find 
themselves in dire straits and faced with the possibility of destitution when divorced 
since they cannot depend on their families (blood relatives) who no longer live as 
extended families but as modern nuclear families. Ex-husbands, more often than not, 
fail to pay maintenance for their children who are primarily left in the care of their 
mothers for periods much longer than envisioned by Islamic law. Fearing possible 
destitution, the wife may as a measure of last resort turn to welfare3 but this provides 
little more than short term relief. It is contended that, given the practical reality of the 
South African context, recognition of Muslim marriages and divorces remains a 
necessary first step in solving this problem and that neither welfare organisations nor 
the broader Muslim community or even the State can or should be solely relied on or 
expected to carry this responsibility. As it is, South Africa currently does not have 
adequate funds to support those already in even more dire straits.4 While the wife is not 
required to make a contribution to the maintenance of children and even herself if she is 
in need thereof, this does not detract from the reality and the fact that women do so 
contribute, if not out of necessity then simply because they have the means and want to 
do so.5   
                                                        
2
 For a detailed history of the engagement of the SALRC with Islamic law, see Moosa N, Unveiling the 
Mind. The Legal Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 143-162 (2nd ed Cape Town: 
Juta 2011) [hereinafter Moosa 2011]. 
3
 See Toffar AK, Administration of Islamic Law of Marriage and Divorce in South Africa 262-264 
(Durban-Westville 1993). 
4
 See Skelton A, et al Family Law in South Africa 351 (see note 149) (Cape Town: Oxford Uni. Press 
2010) [hereinafter Skelton 2010].  
5
 A recent study conducted among a sample of 295 Muslim women in the Western Cape, one of nine 
provinces in South Africa, suggests ‘…that the division of labour and the relative financial 
contributions of Muslim wives and husbands may be shifting to the point that men are no longer 
primarily the sole breadwinners in Muslim households…’ (Shaikh et al, Submission. The Research 
Report South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and Reproductive Choices 4 (Paper 
submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (2011).  
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It is in this context that Muslim marriages and related rights are in the process of 
being formally recognised and such recognition is proposed to take place by adjusting 
South African law which, given the formal recognition of African customary marriages 
in 1998 and Civil Unions in 2006, is presently already recognised as a hybrid or mixed 
legal system. Following a protracted6 process, a statement or ‘code’ of Muslim Personal 
Law (MPL)7 has been framed that can satisfy and synthesise both diverse Muslim 
(ideological) perspectives and the relevant constitutional commands (guarantees of 
religious freedom and equality to all South Africans). One of the key objectives of the 
proposed legislation is to formally regulate the consequences flowing from the 
termination of Muslim marriages through divorce. The proposed legislation does not, 
however, reform divorce laws but accords with divorce rules developed by the Sunni 
schools of Islamic law (Shari’a)8 as they are currently understood and implemented in 
practice in the Muslim world.9 It also does not spell out the Islamic law detailed in this 
paper. 
In South Africa, MPL is informally and unofficially regulated by essentially 
conservative male religious authorities (ulama) in quasi-judicial Muslim religious 
tribunals variously located in the provinces of South Africa. Their decisions, although 
morally binding, are not legally enforceable. Recalcitrant husbands, therefore, cannot be 
legally compelled to abide by the decisions of these tribunals or to give effect to the 
usually limited consequences flowing from their divorces. This has often resulted in 
Muslim women, who are often the first to be burdened with the duty of custody (care) 
of their children, being left with no other option but to seek recourse in terms of South 
African law and to approach secular courts for relief. When provided by secular courts, 
relief is usually, although not necessarily, limited to the confines of Islamic law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6
 See supra note 2. 
7
 MPL refers to the religion (divine) based private or family law and pertains to, among other things, 
marriage, divorce, maintenance, the custody and guardianship of children, and succession (inheritance) 
(Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 10,82). The basic prescriptions of Islamic law (Shari’a), as established in 
the primary sources of Islam, namely, the Qur’an (holy book of Islam) and Sunna (Hadith or traditions 
of Prophet Muhammad based on the Qur’an), from which Islamic law is ultimately derived and on 
which it is based, regulate in the main matters of MPL. To provide legislative guidance for solutions to 
new problems, two further secondary ‘sources’ were developed from and added to the two primary 
sources by human endeavour, namely, ijma (consensus of opinion of either legal scholars or the 
community) and qiyas (analogical deductions, through independent reasoning or ijtihad and ijma) 
(Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 9,30).    
8
 The elaborate Shari’a divorce rules were developed by four male jurists, namely, Imams (lit. leaders) 
Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i and Hanbal, who founded the four traditionalist Sunni schools (madhhabs or 
versions) of law, namely, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, named after them (Moosa 2011, supra 
note 2 at 56). This paper focuses on these Sunni (as opposed to Shi’ite) schools and, where relevant, on 
the differences of opinion among its founding jurists, even within the same school. South African born 
Muslims and their ulama are essentially followers of the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools (Moosa 2011, supra 
note 2 at 151).  
9
 Since the 1950s there was an increase in the number of states that adopted their own codes of MPL. 
The law was codified, amended or reformed based on re-interpretation of the Shari'a. Today almost 
every Arab state has its own personal law code, with Shari’a still forming the basis of MPL, albeit 
reformed, codified and applied by modern legal structures (Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 68-69 and 74-
75). See infra note 23. 
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3. Constitutional , Legislative and Judicial Contexts  
 
The current, and secular, South African Constitution10 does not constitutionalise the 
right to have MPL recognised.  However, following the trend in Muslim countries, the 
only area of law that the Constitution expressly permits to be governed by religious law 
is family law11 and therefore expressly affords it constitutional protection, if recognised.  
As a result, a court cannot deem (discriminatory) religious family law as inherently in 
violation of the Constitution’s freedom of religion clause (s 15 (1)). However, unlike the 
case in some Muslim countries, a court, relying on the provisions12 in the Constitution 
can require that MPL be consistent with it and its Bill of Rights and therefore in a 
‘subordinate’ or ‘inferior’ position to other constitutional rights, especially equality (s 9) 
and human dignity (s 10).  
The South African legislature13 and judiciary14, increasingly since the demise of 
apartheid and the introduction of our first democratic interim (1993)15 and current 
(1996) Constitutions, have, albeit indirectly and in a piecemeal fashion, recognised both 
monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages and divorces by giving effect to some 
of the consequences flowing from the termination of Muslim marriages by death or 
divorce in order to provide relief to women and children.  Recently this has also been 
extended by courts in several cases to include interim relief which, in terms of Rule 43 
of the High Court Uniform Rules of Court (1999), ought only to be available to spouses 
in civil marriages.16 Courts have, however, not directly recognised Muslim marriages or 
resolved interpretational complexities in this regard. The judiciary maintains that it is 
the role of the legislature to do so. 
  Cognisant of the practical realities of non-recognition, the legislature in its turn 
hopes to change the status quo by formally giving direct statutory recognition to 
Muslim marriages.  To this end, and in order to find a happy medium between the 
constitutional allowances therefor and the broad programme and trend of codification 
and reform in the Muslim world, from 2001 to 2010, three Draft Bills on the recognition 
of Muslim marriages and related matters have been proposed: the 2001 Islamic 
                                                        
10
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [hereinafter current Constitution].  
11
 Section 15 (3)(a) allows for the enactment of legislation recognizing ‘(i) marriages concluded 
under…a system of religious, personal or family law; or (ii) systems of personal or family 
law…adhered to by persons professing a particular religion’.  
12
 Section 15 (3)(b) and s 39 (3) (interpretation clause). 
13
 Various Acts, or sections thereof, expressly provide that they apply to de facto monogamous or 
polygynous religious marriages. For a detailed list see Heaton J, South African Family Law 232 (3rd ed 
Durban. LexisNexis 2010) [hereinafter Heaton 2010] and Rautenbach et al ‘Religious Legal Systems: 
Law of Marriage - Muslim Law’ in Rautenbach C, et al (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South 
Africa 192 (3 ed Durban. LexisNexis 2010) [hereinafter Rautenbach 2010].   
14
 In addition to the clear statutory recognition referred to in supra note 13, the courts have also 
interpreted the wording of several other statutory provisions to extend to Muslim marriages. Apart from 
this, the courts have, in several other decisions which did not pertain to interpretation of legislation, 
also extended limited recognition to Muslim marriages.  For a detailed list of these decisions see 
Heaton 2010, supra note 13 at 232-235, Rautenbach 2010, supra note 13 at 198-203) and Moosa 2011, 
supra note 2 at 147-149. See also Mbatha et al ‘Culture and Religion’ in Bonthuys, E & Albertyn, C 
(eds). Gender, Law and Justice 162,171-172 (Cape Town: Juta. 2007).  
15
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.   
16
 Rule 43 makes it possible for either spouse in a civil marriage to apply for several forms of interim 
relief for himself or herself or their children in matters pertaining to maintenance, care of and contact 
with a child, and a contribution to the costs of legal fees, whilst an instituted matrimonial action is 
pending. For detail on these and other unreported cases see Rautenbach  2010, supra note 13 at 203), 
Heaton 2010, supra note 13 at 235) and Skelton 2010, supra note 4 at 197 (see note 18). 
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Marriages Bill (2001 IMB), the 2003 Muslim Marriages Bill (2003 MMB) and the 2010 
Muslim Marriages Bill (2010 MMB)17 (essentially an amended version of the 2003 
MMB). Since it is the latest published version, the 2010 MMB (MMB) forms the focus 
of this paper. The MMB provisions pertaining to custody, guardianship and 
maintenance created the least contention and conform with Islamic law in according 
rights and protection to women and children and regulating the corresponding duties of 
men. 
 
4. Religious Context  
 
The topic of divorce in the primary sources and its later codification (Shari’a) is one 
that inevitably raises tensions because of real inequities which exist in the divorce law 
contained in these sources and which generally favour men over women. The later 
Islamic law, although there are many areas of congruence, is also often at variance with 
the provisions of the earlier primary sources. While marriage and divorce in terms of the 
moral code of Islam generally emphasise the rights of women and corresponding duties 
of men, codes of MPL based on Islamic law are biased towards men and place a 
stronger emphasis on their rights and corresponding duties of women. As far as divorce 
is concerned, in return for limited rights to, for example, maintenance and custody, the 
wife has to sacrifice almost all her rights expressly provided by Islam, for example, the 
right to equitable, honourable and kind treatment and mutual agreement and 
consultation in matters pertaining to personal law, and is placed in an inferior position. 
 In terms of Islamic law, and premised on what today is deemed to be an outmoded 
and patriarchal Islamic ideal, especially in the current South African constitutional 
context, an economic superiority is attributed to Muslim husbands and fathers as a result 
of their being sole providers (breadwinners) and maintainers of dependant wives and 
children during the subsistence of their Muslim marriage(s). Notwithstanding that 
women are entitled to this support because they generally receive half the share of males 
in terms of the Islamic law of inheritance, in terms of what is deemed to be a 
controversial Qur’anic injunction (Q.4:34)18 since it deems women to be dependents of 
economically superior men, the husband is duty bound to unilaterally support and 
maintain (nafaqa) his family. All that is expected as a quid pro quo from the wife, to 
justify her religious entitlement to such support, is that she in turn be a dutiful and 
obedient wife and good mother. 
                                                        
17
 The 2001 IMB and 2003 MMB are, respectively, appended as Annexures B (pages 134-151) and A 
(pages 110-133) to the SALRC Project 59 Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters, (Pretoria, 
July 2003) which is available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj59_2003jul.pdf.  The text 
of the 2010 MMB (as approved and recommended by the SALRC in 2003 and adapted by the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development) is available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2010_muslim-marriages-bill.pdf [all accessed 31 August 
2012].  
18
 The Qur’anic references in this paper refer to the translation by Yusuf Ali (1946).  The first number 
in the citation refers to the number of the chapter (surah) and the second number indicates the verse 
(ayat). See Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 21-23. 
For further reference to Q.4:34 and a discussion of the controversies pertaining both to this verse and to 
Q.2:228 see Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 26, 46, 106-107, note 99). See also Nasir JJ, The Status of 
Women under Islamic Law and Modern Islamic Legislation vol I Arab and Islamic Laws Series 105 (3 
ed Leiden. Brill NV 2009) [hereinafter Nasir 2009], see also infra note 61. For inheritance law see 
Moosa N Comparative Study of the South African and Islamic Law of Succession and Matrimonial 
Property with Especial Attention to the Implications for the Muslim Woman 135 (unpublished LLM 
thesis, Bellville. Uni. of the Western Cape 1991) [hereinafter Moosa 1991].   
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The husband’s increased responsibilities are in turn also deemed to justify, on the 
one hand, his unilateral right to divorce and sole guardianship rights over the children 
and therefore their continued support upon divorce, and, on the other hand, the 
temporary support of his wife, and her limited right to custody of the children upon 
divorce.  
If the husband cannot afford to or reneges on his duty to maintain the children, the 
mother is usually duty bound to do so in spite of the clear Qur’anic injunction (4:34) 
that she is not obliged to do so. Thus, in spite of the Islamic ideal, the South African 
reality is that Muslim children (and their mothers) are often not only inadequately 
maintained during marriage, but also unable to secure the limited financial resources 
that they are entitled to upon divorce, and even when religious tribunals have decided in 
their favour.  While they await formal recognition of Muslim marriages and divorces, 
women are, therefore, often forced to seek relief for themselves and their children in 
terms of secular legislation and from the courts in South Africa. Given that approaching 
the courts is a costly affair, most of the cases where significant gains were made were 
test cases instituted on an ad hoc basis, and all initiated by women. While the 
precedents set ultimately benefit all women and their children, the successful party 
herself often gained very little real (financial) benefit. Cognisant that in terms of Islamic 
law effective custody and guardianship ultimately remain vested in the ex-husband, 
whose financial and maintenance obligations to the ex-wife, though generous upon and 
during marriage, are severely curtailed upon and after divorce, the MMB19 regulates the 
usually limited consequences that flow from Muslim divorces and synthesises them 
with the provisions of South African law. In doing so, it succeeds in making generous 
provision for children.  
 
5. The Position of Minors and Dependent Children  
 
5.1   Guardianship (Wilaya)20, Care (Custody or Hadana)21, Contact (or 
Access)  
 
As indicated, in South Africa religious marriages, and therefore Muslim marriages, are 
currently recognised in terms of, and for the purposes set out in, several Acts. One of 
these is the Children’s Act (2005)22 which deals with the protection of the rights of a 
child. While of the main grievances against MPL are also directed against the laws 
relating to custody, guardianship and maintenance, a more radical example of reform 
includes the introduction of the concept of the ‘best interests of the child’ which enables 
women to retain custody of their children in the event of divorce even though they may 
have remarried, or even to retain custody for an extended period beyond that to which 
                                                        
19
 Clauses 10 and 11. 
20
 See Moosa N ‘Muslim Personal Laws Affecting Children: Diversity, Practice and Implications for a 
New Children’s Code for South Africa’ 115 South African Law Journal 479 (1998) [hereinafter Moosa 
1998], for earlier research in this regard and WLUML Knowing Our Rights: Women, Family, Laws and 
Customs in the Muslim World 337-341 (3ed London. Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) 
2006) [hereinafter WLUML 2006]. 
21
 Literally, means ‘caring’ in Arabic. A female custodian of a child is referred to as a ‘hadina’ whilst a 
male custodian is referred to as a ‘hadini’ (Nasir The Islamic Law of Personal Status vol XXIII Arab 
and Islamic Laws Series 263 (3 ed The Hague. Kluwer Law Int. 2002) [hereinafter Nasir 2002]. 
22
 See the definition of marriage in s 1 (1) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 [hereinafter Children’s Act], 
supra note 13 and supra text to note 60.  
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she would normally be entitled in terms of Islamic law.23 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that, while this concept is also very much a part of South African law24, it also plays a 
pivotal role in the MMB and legislation in other Muslim countries. South Africa has 
moved away from the concept of parental power or authority to parental rights and 
responsibilities (which include, caring for, maintaining contact with, acting as guardian 
for, and contributing to the maintenance of, the child). The term ‘custody’ has been 
replaced with the term ‘care’, and ‘contact’ is similar in meaning to ‘access’ (or 
visitation rights).  Guardianship may also be co-exercised or shared by parents.25  In 
contrast to the Children’s Act, Muslim countries still refer to concepts like ‘custody’ 
(which is also treated as a form of guardianship) and ‘access’ in their traditional 
meanings when referring to Islamic law in state legislation pertaining to children. Since 
this is also the case in South Africa in both the 2010 MMB and the Divorce Act 
(1979)26, these terms will be used in this paper for the sake of convenience.  
Muslim children begin their first (natural) phase of life under female custody. Once 
this (limited) period terminates, they enter into a new phase under male guardianship. 
Having regard to both the Islamic and South African contexts, clause 10 (1) of the 2010 
MMB clearly indicates that: 
 
‘[i]n making an order for the custody of, or access to a minor child, or 
in making a decision on guardianship, the court must, with due regard 
to Islamic law…Islamic norms and values, consider the welfare and 
best interests of the child.’   
 
Clause 10 (1) does not specify which parent, if any, gets awarded custody or/and 
guardianship nor does it stipulate the period of such custody or guardianship.  It can, 
therefore, be inferred that either parent (therefore equal rights), both parents, neither 
parent, or someone other than the parents can be granted custody and/or guardianship 
since the term ‘parent’ is not used. While Islamic law is not spelt out in the MMB, it is 
also important that any decision in terms of the MMB be guided by considerations and 
interpretations of Islamic law.   
The Qur’an itself does not specify which parent gets custody of the children in the 
event of a divorce but it does appear to accept the father’s perpetual (legal) right of 
guardianship. As indicated, although not without controversy, the latter is inferred from 
the Qur’anic (4:34) economic superiority attributed to Muslim men as maintainers of 
the family (and also by reference to the Prophet Muhammad himself27). Islamic 
jurisprudence recognises only the father as the natural guardian of his minor children 
and provides that the divorced fathers (and relatives) of children generally have both 
more (albeit supervisory) guardianship rights and more (financial) duties than their 
(caretaker) divorced mothers (and relatives). That women are usually attributed the 
                                                        
23
 See supra note 9.  
24
 See, for example, s 28 (2) of the current Constitution (supra note 10) and s 9 of the Children’s Act 
(supra note 22).  
25
 See Chapter 1, section 1 (interpretation) and Chapter 3, section 18 (2) (parental responsibilities and 
rights) and section 18 (3) (shared guardianship) of the Children’s Act (supra note 22).   
26
 Although the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 refers to these terms, it does not define them and therefore 
needs to be aligned with the Children’s Act (supra note 22). 
27
 This is based on an inference drawn from an extract in the Prophet’s last sermon given in 632 AD on 
his farewell pilgrimage (hajj) to the holy city of Mecca, to the effect that the child belongs to the 
(father’s) bed on which it was born (rather than to the mother who gave birth to him or her) (Moosa 
2011, supra note 2 at 41). 
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initial (and, therefore, also limited) and natural role of custody of children, is clear from 
the Islamic law definition which defines custody as  
 
‘...caring for the infant [of either sex] during the period when it cannot 
do without the women28 related to it in a prohibited [29] degree [of 
marriage] who have the lawful right to bring it up’.30 
 
Islamic law, rather than necessarily distinguishing between the terms ‘custody’ and 
‘guardianship’, effectively treats custody as (a form of) guardianship.  The mother’s 
(right to and duty of) custody of her child during the early years of its life is, therefore, 
limited and is regarded as one (usually the first) of three categories of guardianship of 
the child. However, this does not mean that Muslim women and men have equal rights 
in this regard. Women are often also under the mistaken impression that they lose 
custody of their children if they divorce their husbands and it is also not uncommon for 
some Muslim men to capitalise on this ignorance and to use custody as a lever against 
their wives to discourage them from divorcing their husbands.  The reality is that 
divorced mothers often find themselves having the actual (physical) responsibility of 
custody but few supervisory rights. The other two categories, namely, guardianship of 
the education and property of the child, are usually entrusted to the father (or other male 
relatives).31 Paradoxically, the fact that she may be financially competent and is allowed 
by Islam to control her own, and own, property unaided is of little consequence. The 
mother of the child, whether married to or divorced from the father, always has the first 
claim (and duty) to custody of her (infant) child.32 Although not explicitly stated and 
with due regard to the father’s unilateral duty to support his children and the mother’s 
initial right to custody, it seems that the MMB also supports the Islamic law view that 
custody be awarded to the wife (mother) in the first instance, as well as in the case of 
interim custody.33  
Custody may, however, be entrusted to someone other than the mother, who may 
also be the father. In terms of the MMB, in the absence of both parents, a court must 
also consider Islamic law when awarding custody or guardianship to anyone else.34  
According to the Sunni schools of law the mother (or any other female custodian 
(hadina)) will lose her limited right to custody if she marries a man who is a stranger 
(that is, not a blood relative) to the child. There ought to be a close but different familial 
connection between the mother and the child and between the man and the child (which 
does not extend to the mother)35. This condition is based on a Prophetic tradition which 
effectively granted a divorced wife the custody of her son unless she marries. While this 
                                                        
28
 My emphasis added in italics. This refers to the mother of the child in the first instance and other 
female custodians. In the event that the mother dies or is disqualified from custody (she loses her 
limited right to custody if she is unable (or unwilling) to take care of her children), there is great 
variation in the rulings of the schools of law as to who replaces her in this regard. The Hanafi school, 
for example, rules that since the mother has first claim to custody, her relatives, rather than those on the 
side of her child’s father, should be given preference (Nasir 2009, supra note 18 at 187). See infra note 
43. 
29
 Prohibited degrees refer to those persons related by blood, marriage or fosterage (breastfeeding or 
nursing) who are forbidden to marry each other. 
30
 Nasir 2009, supra note 18 at 186. 
31
 Nasir 2002, supra note 21 at 158. 
32
 Id at 159. 
33
 Clauses 10 (1) and (2) read with clauses 11 (2)(c)(ii) and 9 (3)(g)(i) (interim custody).  
34
 Clause 10 (3). 
35
 Moosa 2011, supra note 2 at 42. 
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tradition is said to imply that a divorced woman loses this right if she marries any man 
who is not the father even if the man she marries is a blood relative of the child, it has 
not been interpreted so ‘sweepingly’ by jurists.36 It is suggested that this tradition also 
implies that a divorced woman, by the mere act of re-marrying, may lose custody of her 
child. Presumably, her marital duties towards her new husband will preoccupy all her 
time leaving her with no time to care for her children.     
The above categories make it clear that Islamic law separates the custody of the 
mother (to which she is entitled irrespective of her mainly Christian or Jewish (kitabi) 
religion in the case of inter-religious marriages)37 from the sole and legal guardianship 
of the father. The mother’s custody (and regardless of whether or not she may want this 
role) is clothed as a ‘right’ but actually amounts to a ‘duty’. It encompasses the daily 
grind of responsibility for and physical care of the child, in contrast to the more 
supervisory guardianship role of the father over the person, education and property of 
the child.  In terms of Islamic law and as is in fact legislated in some Muslim countries, 
parents, regardless of who may have custody, may not prevent each other from seeing 
their children. They are bound to give each other access.38 This is also the case in terms 
of the MMB39 with regard to both custody and guardianship. 
 
5.2   Periods of Custody and Guardianship 
 
The provisions of the MMB do not specify the periods of custody and guardianship and, 
therefore, guidance must be sought in Islamic law rulings which may also vary 
according to the school of law. The mother’s period of custody (form of guardianship) 
of her child, in respect of which there is no limitation in the Qur’an and Sunna, has been 
determined as a result of the ijtihad (independent reasoning or interpretation) of early 
jurists who also hold different views in this regard. According to these views, women 
are usually denied custody of their children beyond a certain age depending on the 
gender of the child and the school of law (madhhab) to which the family subscribes. 
The Hanbalite school does not distinguish on the basis of the sex of the child and rules 
that the mother’s custody is from birth till 7 years, at which time the child may choose 
between his or her parents. The ruling of the Shafi’ite school is more complicated. Like 
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the Hanbalites, it also does not make a distinction between the sexes while the child is 
in the custody of the mother, nor do these jurists set a definite term. The mother’s 
custody is deemed to continue until the child reaches an age of discretion and is able to 
choose between the parents. However, the matter is not as clear cut as that. If the boy 
chooses his mother, he resides with her during the night but spends the day with his 
father (who is responsible for his education). The girl who chooses her mother resides 
with her for the duration of the mother’s period of custody. The child who chooses both 
gets to spend time with the parents according to lots drawn by them. If the child remains 
silent (undecided?) on the matter, he/she stays with the mother. According to the 
Malikite school, the son stays with the mother from birth till puberty, and the daughter 
till she gets married.40 According to the Hanafite school, custody for both sexes starts at 
birth and ends for a son when he reaches an age where he is (independently) able to do 
certain basic things, such as, eat, dress and keep himself clean. While this age may 
range from seven to nine years, the mother’s custody of her son (or that of any other 
caregiver of the boy) usually ends at seven years of age. The Hanifite jurists differ as 
regards the period of custody of a girl. The prevailing opinion is that it ends with her 
reaching puberty which may range from nine to eleven years. Others are of the opinion 
that she may stay with her mother or grandmother until the ‘age of womanhood’ but 
only until the age of puberty if she is in the custody of another female.41  While the 
terms ‘womanhood’ and ‘puberty’ are generally construed in secular parlance to have 
the same meaning, that is, when a girl starts to menstruate, Nasir42 highlights that this 
need not necessarily be the case since some women can menstruate at a very young age 
(and well before they can be considered to have reached majority or a marriageable age) 
while others do so at a much later age (well past their adolescence).   
Some Muslim countries, for example, Tunisia and Turkey, have reformed their laws 
by increasing the respective ages and even go as far as equalizing the rights of parents to 
custody and guardianship.   
While Sunni jurists differ on the ages when the mother’s (or other female’s) custody 
of the children should terminate, they assumed that, after a limited period of time 
(custody) with their mothers, children of divorced (or widowed) women pass into the 
care of the father or nearest male agnate relative in the event of the father’s death.43  
The guardianship rights of the father have deprived a woman of the right to bring up 
her children as an equal parent.  However, and with due regard to the fact that men who 
may be excellent caregivers may also suffer from gender stereotyping in matters 
pertaining to custody and guardianship, Muslim women who are forced to, or may even 
choose to, leave their children with their father upon divorcing him or re-marrying could 
view this ‘freedom’ from or ‘rejection’ of ‘natural’ parental responsibilities and duties 
as a re-balancing of priorities and a redressing of past inequalities rather than as 
discrimination in reverse,44 or even as some traditionalists would like them to believe, 
as being liberated from a burdensome role.  
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While there are variations in the laws pertaining to custody and guardianship of 
children, in recent years the rules relating to custody of the mother (and to a much lesser 
extent guardianship of the father) have been relaxed in most Muslim countries in favour 
of the mother, with the welfare or best interests45 of the child being the decisive factor. 
 
5.3. (Periods of) Maintenance (Nafaqa)46  
 
In terms of Islamic law, nafaqa covers maintenance generally owed by a man to his 
dependants. It is also understood as such in terms of the MMB47 which expressly 
stipulates that the provisions of the Maintenance Act (1998)48 apply, ‘with the changes 
required by the context’,49 if a maintenance court makes a maintenance order. This 
means that a court must take into consideration the Islamic law provisions in this regard 
and as outlined in the MMB50. In a nutshell,  upon the termination of his marriage, the 
obligations of a father with regard to his children do not also come to an end.  In terms 
of the MMB, a father is obliged to maintain his daughters ‘until they are married’51, and 
sons ‘until they reach the age of majority or otherwise for the period that they are in 
need of support’.52  
In terms of Islamic law a divorced (unmarried) daughter who is in need of support 
once again becomes the responsibility of the father until her re-marriage. The adult male 
child may, however, also be in need of further support, for example, due to a chronic 
illness or mental or physical handicap which prevents him from earning a living.53  
Given the broader guardianship rights and duties of the father, he has to maintain the 
children during marriage and even if he is separated (divorced) from their mother or if 
the children live elsewhere or are in the custody of another person (including the 
mother).54  Accordingly, more generous provision is made for support of children in the 
MMB which stipulates that his duty to maintain children born of the marriage(s) 
continues when the marriage(s) ends and ‘…includes the provision of food, clothing, 
separate accommodation, medical care and education’.55 
In terms of Islamic law, due regard must be had to the father’s financial means and 
capacity (including the genuine effort he ought to make to ensure that he acquires the 
means to be able to earn a living) or incapacity (for example, due to a chronic illness) to 
provide maintenance.56 This is also reflected in the MMB where the amount of 
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maintenance for which a father is responsible will vary from case to case and ‘must be’ 
determined in a ‘fair and just’57 manner and with due regard to ‘his means’ and the 
special ‘need of support’ for older male children58 and older daughters. This would, 
therefore, also preclude the child who is in possession of his/her own wealth. In terms of 
Islamic law, indigent parents also have similar rights to maintenance from children who 
have the means to provide such support.59 
 As indicated in Section I, it is only since 2005 that Muslim children in South Africa 
are no longer labelled as ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’. Their parents are referred to 
simply as being ‘married’ or ‘unmarried’ and the term ‘children of unmarried parents’ is 
used. In terms of South African law a child is regarded as being born of married parents 
‘if the biological parents were legally married to each other at the time of the child’s 
conception, or at his or her birth, or at any time between conception and birth’.60 A 
practical issue that, therefore, raises its head concerns the question of legitimacy of a 
child conceived during marriage but where the ex-wife’s pregnancy is only ascertained 
during the defined mandatory Qur’anic61 ‘waiting’ or ‘probationary’ period (idda) (lit. 
‘to count’) which must be observed by the wife even after she has been irrevocably 
divorced. Technically, this means that the child will be born ‘out of wedlock’ but in 
reality it is assumed that the child is her husband’s especially since she may also not re-
marry during the idda period. This of course does not rule out the possibility of 
pregnancy resulting from a sexual encounter with somebody else. In the event of a 
divorce, the MMB clearly limits the husband’s duty to support, and issues of interim 
custody or access, to a ‘child born of the marriage’62. Maintenance and guardianship of 
such children is, therefore, also not directly provided for in the proposed MMB. In the 
event of a dispute of this nature arising after an irrevocable separation, Islamic law 
allows that the parentage (maternity and paternity) of children of spouses, besides being 
established through marriage, may also be established through acknowledgement by the 
father or evidence thereof (for example, through paternity testing or the witnessing of 
the birth by a midwife).63  
Sunni jurists are unanimous64 that, following the birth of her child,  a divorced 
mother may breastfeed her baby for the duration of the nursing (‘fosterage’) period 
(which is up to (but not necessarily) two years)65 regardless of whether she is 
irrevocably divorced from the child’s father.  She is entitled to separate remuneration 
while she breastfeeds her own child.66 This is also provided for in terms of the MMB.67 
The mother’s effort which goes into the process of bottle-feeding a child will 
presumably be calculated as part of her additional post-idda expenses, while the actual 
costs of bottle-feeding will form part of the general maintenance due to the child by the 
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father whilst in the mother’s custody and care. It is contended that she should also be 
compensated for bottle-feeding her child during the idda period. During the nursing 
period following an irrevocable divorce, the father must maintain and house both the 
child and mother and this is also provided for in terms of the MMB.68 The parents may 
also decide that the father employ a salaried wet-nurse (or foster mother) to breastfeed 
the child if the mother is unable or unwilling to do so herself.69  
It is clear that the areas of guardianship, care, access and maintenance in relation to 
children often overlap with each other and for this reason it is also very difficult to 
strictly separate the position of the mother (which is not the focus of this paper) from 
that of her children. For example, while maintenance for the child is theoretically 
generously provided by the father, such maintenance ought to be inextricably linked 
with that given to the mother during the post-divorce period that their children are in her 
custody, and this symbiosis ought to lead to an intended augmentation of the usually 
limited amount and period of post-divorce support for the mother. It is, however, 
contended that, with some exception, the inference that mothers may stand to 
substantially benefit through children in their care is currently unfounded in South 
Africa. Although the Islamic ideal, this is simply not a material reality for many South 
African Muslim women who, instead, often have to step into the shoes of the father 
when he reneges on his duties in this regard. It is, therefore, hoped that the provisions of 
the MMB will be able to rectify this.  
In line with the trend already established by courts in terms of Rule 43 concerning 
interim maintenance, but more strictly in accordance with Shari’a, the MMB provides 
that, following the registration of an irrevocable divorce70 and after failed attempts at 
compulsory mediation71, in the event of a dispute and before the adjudication thereof by 
the court, given the urgent nature of these cases, spouses may make an application to 
seek interim relief pending litigation (pendente lite) in matters pertaining to interim 
custody or access to minor children of the marriage or ‘for the payment of 
maintenance’72, contribution to costs73, and maintenance for the wife during the idda 
period74. I have emphasized in italics ‘the payment of maintenance’ to highlight the fact 
that, given the unilateral Islamic law duty of the father to provide maintenance for his 
children, and the initial right of custody of the mother, it is contended that if a court 
grants the mother interim custody, the father is not only responsible for the child’s 
maintenance, but also to remunerate the mother who has custody during this period, and 
further that this is separate from, and in addition to, the idda maintenance of the wife.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Acknowledging the differences that exist between the sources of Islamic law, state legal 
systems in various Muslim countries have sought to exercise some, if not much, control 
over the consequences of an Islamic divorce. The trend of reform in Islamic law of 
divorce has been through judicial regulation, and, although long overdue, South Africa 
is in the process of following suit with its proposed draft legislation which continues to 
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be promoted and which, it is hoped, will be enacted into law by the end of 2012. The 
MMB has, through its provisions, ensured that the limited rights guaranteed to children 
in terms of Islamic law will be utilised optimally, and in so doing will allow Islamic law 
rights to be upheld secularly with the force of law and with the co-operation of religious 
authorities. If the legislature fails to enact the MMB, it will mean that the children and 
their mothers for whom the MMB is intended to be of most benefit, the status quo of 
non-recognition will remain. Current generations of Muslim men and women live with 
the reality that as citizens they can have recourse to secular laws of the state and its 
courts, with or without a recognised MPL, when seeking redress for the hardships 
caused by the consequences of the non-recognition of their Islamic marriages and 
divorces.   
 
